SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM:  
HOW MIGHT WOMEN FARE?

Highlights

Trends in female labor force participation rates, female earnings as a percent of male earnings, and women’s pension coverage all point to improvements in the economic status of women that have taken place in recent decades. In the years ahead, more women will be receiving Social Security and pension benefits based on their own work histories and, in the aggregate, are likely to have higher real incomes in retirement than women who are retired today.

Despite these positive trends, many millions of women will receive low or no private pension benefits and will remain heavily dependent upon Social Security for retirement-income support. Thus, how Social Security treats women, and how women might fare under various proposals to restore long-term solvency to the Social Security system are matters of critical concern to women.

This issue brief examines the potential impact on women of a number of proposed Social Security reforms. Some of the changes would maintain the system’s social insurance principles, while others call for a privatized system that would allow workers to invest all or part of their Social Security contributions in the private market.

Privatization, even partial privatization, poses big risks, especially for persons with limited resources. How the market has performed historically, for example, cannot be counted on to apply to specific groups of workers or to the time that a particular cohort retires. The market does not just go up, and declines can be swift, deep, and prolonged. Low-income women would have less to invest and would be less able than higher-income women to weather market downturns.

Women appear to be more conservative investors than men. Under a privatized system, two investors with identical earnings but different investment philosophies could end up with very different retirement benefits. Women, in such instances, could expect the lower accumulations.

Because Social Security is gender neutral, men and women with identical work histories and earnings can expect identical benefits. In the private market, however, sellers of annuities can take into consideration women’s longer life expectancy. Thus, the same accumulation may purchase lower monthly benefits for women than for men.

Social Security provides benefits to the spouses and survivors of workers eligible for Social Security. Not all privatization proposals would require account owners to annuitize their accumulations. This could leave married women and survivors with no assurance of any income from their husbands’ retirement investments.

Divorced women are entitled to Social Security benefits based on the earnings of their former husbands, if they had been married for at least ten years. Under some proposed changes to Social Security, such women would apparently have to depend on the vagaries of the divorce court for any share of the accumulations in their husbands’ privatized accounts.

Other more modest changes to Social Security have also been proposed, and some of them could adversely affect women. For example, because women’s average work histories remain much shorter than men’s, they would find it hard to meet an increase in the number of years included in the benefit computation formula or a higher normal retirement age.
Introduction

Women’s rising labor force participation rates, increasing earnings, and expanded pension coverage (Tables 1 to 4) point to a brighter old age for millions of women, who at one time could count on little in the way of retirement income beyond a Social Security benefit based on the earnings of their husbands. Growing numbers of women in the future will receive Social Security and private pension benefits as a result of their own work histories, and many will be able to supplement those benefits with income from savings and investments.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>16+</th>
<th>24-34</th>
<th>35-44</th>
<th>45-54</th>
<th>55-64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite these developments, the retirement income security of millions of women in the near- and longer-term future is by no means guaranteed.¹ Women with lengthy work careers and jobs with high wages and pension coverage may look forward to a financially secure old age, but even they could find themselves at risk of outliving their assets and watching the value of their private pensions dwindle from even moderate inflation or a stay in a nursing home. Moreover, although women’s employment prospects have brightened considerably over the past several decades, their labor force attachment and work experiences have yet to measure up to men’s, and it is on work patterns more typical of men that much of the country’s retirement-income system is based.

Women are still more likely than men to be out of the labor force at any age, to experience discontinuous work histories, and to be employed part time--all of which have implications for their ability to accrue pension credits and save for retirement.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number with Earnings (in 000s)</th>
<th>Annual Earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>25,926</td>
<td>$15,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>34,727</td>
<td>$17,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>42,940</td>
<td>$20,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>46,944</td>
<td>$21,185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Government efforts to encourage people to assume more responsibility for their own well-being in old age notwithstanding, Social Security will continue to provide much of the retirement income on which millions of women depend. Hence, how Social Security are, and most likely will remain, more vulnerable financially than men. For this reason, and because the number of vulnerable older women far exceeds the number of vulnerable men, this paper focuses on women.
treats women, and how women might fare under various proposals designed to restore long-term solvency to the Social Security system, are matters of critical concern to women. This issue brief examines the importance of Social Security to women now and into the 21st century, especially with respect to their continued economic vulnerability. It also addresses issues of benefit adequacy and equity for women and assesses how some of the more prominent proposed changes to the Social Security system might affect them.

Table 3
Female Earnings as Percent of Male Earnings: 1970-1996 (median earnings of full-time workers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Year-round workers.

Income Security in Old Age

Not only do over 90 percent of women aged 65 or older collect Social Security benefits, but Social Security accounts for over half the income of nonmarried women in this age group and 38 percent of the income of married couples. In fact, Social Security actually contributed more to household income for couples and nonmarried women in 1994 than it did in 1976 (Grad and Foster 1979: Table 28; Grad 1996: Tables I.8 and VII.2). Social Security plays almost as important a role in the financial well-being of nonmarried older men. (See Figure 1.)

Social Security was designed to help protect people against income loss resulting from events—retirement and disability, in particular—over which they have little or no control. While never intended to serve as the sole source of retirement income, it is just that for approximately 2.7 million nonmarried elderly women and nearly three-fourths of a million aged married couples (Grad 1996: Table VI.B.2).

Table 4
Women’s Pension Coverage Rates, Full-time Private Wage and Salary Workers: 1972-1993 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Department of Labor et al. 1994 Table B16.

Fewer than one in five (18 percent) elderly women were receiving income from private pensions or annuities in 1994. A much higher proportion (two-thirds) reported owning assets, but median asset income in 1994 was barely over $1,300 for all aged recipients; among nonmarried women, the median was less than $900 (ibid.: Table V.D.1).

Subject to numerous uncertainties under the best of circumstances, Social Security projections are especially problematic in light
of recently proposed reform measures. As noted above, in the future, women will have greater access to sources of retirement income in addition to Social Security, as their behavior continues to undergo changes. For example, as Ross (1997) notes, women nearing retirement age--55 to 64 years old--had a labor force participation rate of 41 percent 30 years ago, when they were 25 to 34. Women who are between the ages of 25 and 34 today, in contrast, have a participation rate of 75 percent. For this as well as other reasons, seven in ten baby boomer females in 2030 are expected to have pensions and assets in addition to Social Security, according to simulations by Lewin-VHI (AARP 1994: Table 10). Only about one in 25 female boomers is likely to have income from only one of these sources.²

Despite these developments, reliance on Social Security may not lessen as dramatically as women’s changing roles might suggest, at least not for several decades. Pension coverage rates have stagnated since the 1970s, and although more future retirees will receive pensions, the amounts could be small. This is because the average benefits to shorter tenured workers “who would not have received pensions previously” may be low (U.S. General Accounting Office 1997: 7).

In addition, efforts to foster personal savings “appear to have had only marginal success” (U.S. General Accounting Office 1997: 7). The temptation to utilize lump-sum pension distributions upon job change may be overwhelming for many workers (see, e.g., Korczyk 1996a and 1996b), leaving future retirees with less retirement income than pension coverage rates might imply. When offered the chance, workers are apparently far more likely to opt for lump-sum payouts, even at retirement (Salisbury 1997), when a lifetime annuity might be more appropriate.

At least one set of simulations warns that Social Security’s contribution to aggregate income could change only modestly, especially for nonmarried women through 2030 (Zedlewski, et al. 1989), a conclusion echoed by Lewin-VHI for widowed females (AARP 1994).³

Vulnerability in Old Age

Social Security has been a major contributor to the marked decline in poverty among elderly persons in recent decades. In 1966, nearly 29 percent of persons aged 65 and older had incomes below the official poverty level, but by 1996, that figure had fallen to just 10.8 percent, partly the result of substantial Social Security benefit increases in the 1970s and automatic cost-of-living increases as of 1975. The overall poverty rate for the older population is now below that for the population under the age of 18 (Lamison-White 1997; see Figure 2).

² In 1994, only 5 percent of aged married couples and 1 percent of nonmarried women received three or more retirement benefits (Grad 1996: Table I.6).

³ Zedlewski et al., for example, estimate that Social Security will account for 68 percent of the aggregate income of nonmarried women in 2030, while Lewin-VHI projects that it will account for almost 49 percent of the income of widows.
Policy Institute indicate that the 1995 poverty rate for persons 65 and older would have risen from 10.5 percent to 47.8 percent if their Social Security benefits had been eliminated. Without Social Security, the poverty rate of older women—who predominate among the aged poor—would have been 52.9 percent in 1995, rather than 13.6 percent.

Aggregate poverty rates obscure significant differences by subgroups that make it clear that, as Choudhury and Leonesio (1997: 1) put it, “the gains that have accrued to the aged in aggregate have not been equally shared by men and women.” So, for example, older women have a higher poverty rate than older men; nonmarried women are far worse off than married women; minority women have much higher rates of poverty than white women (see Table 5); very old women (85-plus) are at greater risk of being poor than women in their 60s.

Women’s Eligibility for Social Security

Women can receive Social Security benefits in old age in one of essentially three ways—based on their own work histories and earnings records, based on the work histories and earnings records of their husbands, or based on a combination of the two. Women with the requisite Social Security coverage (a minimum of 40 quarters for workers reaching retirement age today) are entitled to a full retired worker benefit at the age of 65. Actuarially reduced benefits are available to qualified workers as early as age 62.

If, upon reaching retirement age, a woman is married or had been married for at least ten years before becoming divorced, she may be entitled to spousal benefits that at their maximum are equal to half of her husband’s or ex-husband’s retired worker benefit. 6

Women receiving spousal benefits may have worked during their marriages, but not enough to qualify for benefits of their own that exceed their spousal benefits. Women lacking 40 quarters of coverage are entitled only to spousal benefits. 7

Table 5
Poverty Rates of Selected Groups: 1996
(in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Poverty Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons 65 and older</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons under age 18</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 65 and older</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men 65 and older</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White women 65 and older</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black women 65 and older</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic women 65 and older</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married women 65 and older</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmarried women 65 and older*</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes separated women.


More likely today, married women will have worked enough to qualify for retired worker benefits of their own but, upon reaching retirement age, find that their own benefits amount to less than half of their spouses’. Technically, these women—who are

4 For ease of reading and because it is concerned primarily with women, this issue brief will generally refer only to women even when the observations apply to men as well. Social Security, it should be stressed, is gender neutral.

5 Under certain circumstances, workers may also qualify for benefits at younger ages, e.g., if they become disabled. A very few Social Security beneficiaries are receiving special age-72 benefits or benefits as parents; however; these beneficiaries are not treated in this issue brief.

6 Early (pre-65) collection of benefits results in an actuarial reduction. The full 50-percent spousal benefit is received only when both spouses are 65 or older at the time of receipt.

7 Spousal benefits are sometimes referred to as dependents’ benefits, a term that has come to have a pejorative connotation as the concept of marriage as an economic partnership has achieved greater currency.
“dually entitled”--receive their own retired worker benefits plus an auxiliary benefit that tops their worker benefits up to what they are otherwise entitled to as spouses. In other words, they do, in fact, collect benefits based on their earnings, but this technicality is lost on many married women, who are only too aware that when it comes to old age and survivors’ benefits, they are no better off than if they had never worked for pay. In practical terms, dually entitled beneficiaries get the higher of two benefit amounts; they cannot collect both full benefits.

When spousal benefits were introduced in 1939, relatively few married women worked outside the home, although even then it was assumed that “most wives, in the long run, [would] build up wage credits on their own employment” (Chater cited in U.S. General Accounting Office 1996: 64), as indeed they have. Today, the majority of adult women under the age of 65 are employed outside the home, regardless of marital status or the presence of children. Even the mothers of young children are likely to be employed. As of 1996, nearly 58 percent of married women with a child under the age of three were in the labor force, over 2.5 times the figure 30 years earlier (Ferber 1993 and U.S. Department of Labor 1998).

The figures in Table 6 highlight how women’s changing roles have been reflected in their Social Security benefits, as a growing proportion now collects worker benefits. Over 62 percent of women qualified for worker benefits in 1995, up from 43 percent in 1960. That women are increasingly working long enough to qualify for retired worker benefits of their own is a big plus in the event of divorce.

### Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entitlement</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker only</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dually entitled</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/widow only</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Security Administration 1996: Table 5A.14.

Women today, it is clear, are far less likely to be “dependent” on a spouse, at least as far as Social Security is concerned. This is evident in the decline in wife/widow-only recipients from almost 57 percent in 1960 to just under 38 percent in 1995.

Despite women’s growing labor force attachment, “there are still,” as Ferber (1993: 43) states, “millions of women who have been full-time homemakers most of their lives, although their number has been declining rapidly. There are many more women who have been full-time or part-time homemakers intermittently” (Ferber 1993: 43). Thus, women’s gains have come mainly in the form of dual entitlement (see Table 6). If these women’s own worker benefits had been higher than half of their husband’s, they would be classified as “worker only,” a figure that was actually lower in 1995 than it was in 1960, perhaps as a result of more low-wage women entering the labor force and accumulating sufficient quarters of coverage to qualify for worker benefits. Instead, these dually entitled women do better with what is, in essence, the spousal benefit.

At widowhood--and most women outlive their husbands--survivors either collect their

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8 If they lack the requisite work history, however, married women are not eligible for disability benefits based on their husbands’ work records, so employment does provide them a benefit that marriage alone does not.

9 This designation may be confusing because the beneficiaries in question would have qualified for spousal benefits if they were not entitled to retired worker benefits that are greater than the spousal benefits.
spouses’ full benefits or continue to receive their own retired worker benefits, whichever are greater. They cease to get the 50-percent spousal benefit. The same holds true for divorced women. If their ex-husbands die, they, too, may be eligible for higher survivors’ benefits.

Receipt of benefits based on husbands’ work records and earnings may continue into the foreseeable future, in spite of women’s growing labor force attachment. Sandell and Iams (1996) estimate that women’s changing work patterns and earnings will result in higher income for couples, but little improvement for most widows. A growing proportion of wives, they maintain, will qualify for Social Security benefits of their own that exceed half of their husbands’ benefits but are less than 100 percent of those benefits. If they outlive their husbands, these women will find themselves “better off” with survivors’ benefits than they would be with their own retired worker ones.

The projections of Sandell and Iams suggest that fewer than 20 percent of baby boom widows in the early part of the next century will collect higher benefits based on their own earnings, in contrast to about 8 percent today. As a result, “a sizable proportion, not too different than today’s, of next century’s elderly widows will be at risk of economic distress” (Sandell and Iams 1996: 12).

Reinforcing this observation are projections from the Commonwealth Fund Commission on the Elderly People Living Alone (1987: OR-2), which indicate that by 2020, poverty among the aged will be largely confined to persons living alone, virtually all of whom will be women. Moreover, the gap between these women and other elderly persons is expected to widen. Hence, developments that threaten to undermine the income support the aged now receive should be examined carefully for their potential impact on this vulnerable group.

Social Security Provisions of Particular Importance to Women

Social Security is gender neutral, which means that men and women with identical work histories and earnings can expect identical benefits. The gender neutrality of Social Security extends to its actuarial calculations. In the private market, sellers of annuities can take into consideration the fact that a set sum or accumulation of savings must, on average, last longer in the case of women. Thus, the same accumulation may purchase lower monthly benefits for women than for men, though payments over a lifetime may be the same. This cannot happen under Social Security.

Nonetheless, because women’s and men’s lives are anything but gender neutral, the Social Security benefits they receive typically vary substantially in both type and amount. Not surprisingly, women’s benefits typically are lower than men’s.

At the end of 1995, female retired workers were receiving monthly benefits that averaged $621, in contrast to $810 for men (Social Security Administration 1996: Table 5.A1). This gap reflects less time in the labor force on the part of women, as well as their greater probability of working part time and their continued concentration in lower-wage occupations.

The gender neutrality aspect of Social Security aside, a number of Social Security’s provisions are especially beneficial to women, although men in comparable circumstances would benefit from these provisions as well. For example, 99 percent of the spousal benefit recipients are women, as are 98 percent of the dually entitled (Social Security Administration 1996: Tables 5.A1 and 5.G2). The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) notes that “because women receive spousal and survivor benefits more often than men and, hence, are subject to the dual entitlement limitation more often, these concerns are often
viewed as women’s issues” (U.S. General Accounting Office 1996: 48).

**The Benefit Formula**

Women also gain from the way Social Security benefits are calculated because the benefit calculation formula replaces a higher proportion of the wages of low-wage workers than of higher-wage workers. For single earners with low, average, and high earnings, for example, Social Security replaces, respectively, about 53 percent, 40 percent, and 26 percent of their wages (Steuerle and Bakija 1994: 96).

The progressive benefit formula redistributes income from higher-wage earners to lower-wage earners who, it has been recognized since the system’s inception, would have more difficulty achieving income adequacy in old age than their higher-earning counterparts. Since women are disproportionately found among the lower earners, this “weighted benefit formula” is especially important to them. Private pension benefits lack the redistributive element of a weighted benefit formula, which is a fundamental feature of social insurance in the United States.

The fact that divorced women can collect benefits on their ex-husbands’ work records and that multiple ex-spouses who meet the duration-of-marriage test can collect benefits as divorcees or widows, underscores the role that Social Security plays in protecting against income loss and providing a floor of security. In sum, as Ferber (1993: 43) notes, Social Security “favors lower income workers and makes provisions for spouses who are not employed,” two aspects of the system that favor women as a result.

**Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Protection**

Social Security is a defined benefit retirement income plan that uses a formula set by law to calculate benefits based on earnings up to an annual maximum limit and years of coverage (35 years of highest earnings). Workers can, albeit generally with some help from the Social Security Administration, estimate what their benefits will be under reasonable assumptions about wage increases and years of employment. That is not, however, the case with defined contribution private pension plans, such as 401(k)s, which are claiming an increasing share of the private pension market. With defined contribution plans, market risk is a real risk: retirement annuities or lump-sum distributions from those plans depend on the amount invested and the earnings on the investments. Poor investment choices, as well as both the unwillingness and inability to save, can also undermine retirement-income accumulations.

Moreover, retirees need never fear outliving their Social Security benefits. Because Social Security cannot be taken as a lump sum or as graduated payments or phased withdrawals, beneficiaries can never “use up” their Social Security. Furthermore, because old-age and survivor benefits cannot be cashed out at early ages, qualifying retirees can never get their hands on the money prematurely. Assuming workers have sufficient quarters of coverage, something will always be there for retirement. In contrast, cashouts pose a significant problem for savers in defined contribution plans, especially at the time of a job change. Women are more likely than men to cash out their defined-contribution accumulations before retirement age (Korczyk 1996a).

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10 Of course, the weighted benefit formula is no substitute for improving the wages and benefits of women. High earners still receive higher absolute benefits than low earners, even if those benefits replace a lower proportion of pre-retirement earnings.

11 Women may lose some of that progressivity if their Social Security and private pension benefits are integrated.
Longevity

Longevity should also be kept in mind by women as well as men as they plan for their income needs in old age. Life expectancy at age 65 has risen for both men and women since the early years of Social Security (Figure 3), though the female/male longevity gap is wider than it was six decades ago. As of 1996, at age 65 the average woman could expect to live more than 19 years; future female retirees will have to plan for an even longer retirement. Very old Social Security beneficiaries today, the vast majority of whom are women, are among the poorest of Americans. They may also face catastrophic health and long-term care expenditure at the same time that they risk exhausting their non-Social Security resources. Just how much more secure the very old of the future will be remains to be seen.

One of the great advantages of the Social Security system is that benefits are indexed. This guarantees that retirement benefits maintain their purchasing power over time. Almost no private pensions are automatically indexed, although a few grant ad hoc increases. A very long life expectancy accompanied by even modest inflation can seriously erode private retirement benefits. Private annuitants must purchase indexed annuities if they want any inflation protection in their defined contribution plans, but they pay for that protection in the form of lower benefits.

Social Security and Women’s Unmet Needs

Despite the benefits that accrue to women under Social Security, the program today is not without critics. Its gender neutrality, for example, by definition fails to make allowances for the fact that caregiving responsibilities are one reason that women’s work histories continue to be shorter than men’s. Social Security benefit calculations assume a 40-year work history, with the five lowest years of earnings omitted from the calculation. For women, some or all of these five years may be years of zero earnings. Earnings over the remaining 35 years are averaged, but if Social Security applicants have more than five years of no earnings—as many women still do—anything in excess of five is included as zeros in the estimation of average wages and calculation of benefits.

To be sure, more women are reaching retirement age with a full work history, but most still fall short of the full averaging period. GAO observes that the median number of years with covered earnings was 36 for men reaching age 62 in 1993; it was only 25 for women; less than 20 percent of women had 35 years, in contrast to almost 60 percent of men (Ross 1997).
“Provid[ing Social Security] participants with retirement benefits adequate to secure a basic subsistence standard of living” is the goal that drove the architects of the Social Security system (Steuerle and Bakija 1994: 15-16) and that has driven many of the system’s subsequent reforms. Though attention to equity issues, or the fairness of benefits compared to contributions, was apparent at the outset, benefit adequacy was the greater concern at the outset as the architects of the program sought first to deal with the problem of poverty (ibid.: 14).

Concern about the well-being of dependent family members, particularly women and children, manifested itself in the early days of Social Security. The addition of benefits for wives and children that were not tied to their own work records, according to Derthick (1979: 260-261), “consciously introduced an avoidable bias into the program for the sake of welfare objectives.”

That bias—an inequity accepted for the sake of adequacy—was the advantage accruing to a married couple with a single earner over a two-earner couple with the same earnings. The latter couple might pay the same Social Security taxes as the former, but the couple would collect less from Social Security. Each qualifying worker in a two-earner couple would get a retired worker’s benefit, while the single-earner couple could claim a worker’s benefit and a spousal benefit.

This inequity has proven nettlesome to many dual-earner couples as their numbers have increased. It also translates into an adequacy issue, especially upon widowhood. The benefit to which the surviving spouse, again generally a woman, is entitled will be substantially lower for the survivor of a dual-earner couple than the survivor of the single earner with comparable earnings. Household expenses may fall at this time, but, as Rappaport (1997: 35) observes, “the difference in cost of living is far smaller than the difference in income.” Survivors of dual-earner couples may experience considerable hardship as a result of the decline in household income at this time.

As more married women began to find themselves part of dual-earner couples, issues of equity or fairness began to strike a chord,12 and by the late 1970s, women’s advocates were increasingly seeking to bring some of these issues to the fore. Income adequacy, especially for nonmarried women and the very old, continued to be a concern. Although women’s status in retirement was clearly improving, many women’s advocates agreed with former Congresswoman Mary Rose Oakar, Chair of the House Task Force on Social Security and Women, when she argued that correcting the inequities toward women in the Social Security system was “one of our top domestic issues” (U.S. House of Representatives 1980: 2).

Improving Women’s Status in Old Age

There have been numerous proposals since the 1970s and early 1980s to make Social Security more equitable and/or more adequate for women (see, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives 1980 and 1985; Beedon 1991; Burkhauser and Smeeding 1994; Center for Women Policy Studies 1988; Save Our Security 1996; Steuerle and Bakija 1994). Reform proposals have varied, from the radical solution of earnings-sharing for married couples—whereby the earnings of both partners would be halved and credited to the earnings records of each spouse—to more modest proposals, such as increasing the number of dropout years in the calculation of average earnings under Social Security.

12 GAO (1996) recently summed up the key inequities that have the greatest impact on women: two-earner couples receive lower benefits than one-earner couples with the same earnings; the survivors of these couples get less as well. In addition, dually entitled beneficiaries get no more in Social Security benefits than they would receive if they had never worked.
However, most proposals, as Ferber points out, “have come to naught,” which she does not find surprising, since there is so much disagreement “about what the effects of Social Security are, and what the outcomes should be” (Ferber 1993: 43). Moreover, many of the proposals have been costly, involved benefit cuts to some beneficiaries—never politically popular--, and/or would be phased in over such a long period of time that years or decades would have to pass before full implementation. Hence few women who need help immediately would benefit from the change.

Though momentum for reform that would benefit women under Social Security seemed to be building in the late 1970s, demographic, economic, and other pressures were conspiring against significant improvements. Costly changes, in particular, were beginning to look doomed. By 1983, the Social Security system was in short-term actuarial imbalance, and the situation was urgent. Restoring solvency to the system at that time allowed for very few benefit enhancements, though the modest improvements that were included in the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act were largely seen as “women’s” benefits.13

Social Security for the 21st Century

Despite the fact that the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Trust Funds will build up sizable reserves for the next dozen years, the long term picture is not auspicious for costly benefit improvements, whether or not they involve enhanced adequacy or equity.

While Social Security revenues currently exceed payments, the system is not in actuarial balance over the long-term; the estimated deficit over the 75-year horizon used in Social Security projections amounts to 2.23 percent of taxable payroll for the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds (Board of Trustees 1997).14 The 1997 report of the Social Security Trustees notes that, all else being equal, the trust fund reserves which are currently growing will be drawn down beginning in about 2012 and will be exhausted by 2029.15 Thus, Social Security will be able to pay full benefits on time for more than three decades. To ensure that benefits will be paid in a timely fashion after that date, some changes will be necessary. The only possibilities are revenue increases and/or benefit decreases, the magnitude of which will depend on the specific proposals and when the changes are introduced.

Coupled with the solvency issue is growing concern about declining confidence in the ability of Social Security to pay benefits (see, e.g., Reno and Friedland 1997). According to a 1997 opinion survey by Public Agenda, about one-third of the public thinks “they won’t get any Social Security benefits at all,” up from one-fourth since 1994 (Farkas and Johnson 1997: 23), even though at its lowest point, income to Social Security should be sufficient to pay three-fourths of projected

13 Under these amendments, a divorced spouse who was at least age 62 would be able to collect Social Security benefits based on the earnings of her ex-spouse as long as the ex-spouse was eligible to receive benefits; he need not have begun collecting them. Benefits were also liberalized for certain spouses.

14 This is the average difference between income (e.g., payroll contributions) and outgo (benefits and administrative costs) as a percent of taxable payroll over 75 years. To bring the trust funds into balance, revenues would have to be augmented or costs reduced by an average of 2.23 percent in each of the next 75 years.

15 The sensitivity of deficit projections to the assumptions on which they are based can be seen in the fact that, under the Social Security Actuaries’ low cost assumptions, the OASDI trust funds will never be exhausted (at least over the 75-year period), while under high-cost assumptions, exhaustion will occur in 2018, rather than 2029.
benefits. The Social Security trustees refer to “an alarming erosion of public confidence in the Social Security system over the past few years, particularly among younger generations,” insisting that early action is needed to ensure long-range solvency to restore that confidence (Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees 1997: 13).

As of fall 1997, Social Security reform was not yet on the Congressional Agenda, although President Clinton was promising “to do something soon” about Social Security (Harris 1997: A1), contending that the administration “would fulfill [its] responsibilities to curb the costs of Social Security.” In his 1998 State of the Union address, he called for a national dialogue on Social Security to be facilitated by a series of bipartisan regional forums designed to increase public understanding of Social Security and various reform proposals.

Few politicians relish the prospects of reforming Social Security, long referred to as the third rail of politics. But while reform may be inevitable, opinions vary widely as to the degree of change that is necessary to restore long-range solvency. January 1997 saw the release of the report of the 1994-96 Advisory Council on Social Security, which had been appointed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under Section 706 of the Social Security Act to “advise the public, the Administration, and Congress on how best to prepare” Social Security and Medicare for the future (Advisory Council on Social Security, Vol. I 1997: 6).

The Council’s long-anticipated report was preceded by considerable media attention and discussion by policymakers and Social Security experts and aficionados for at least two reasons. This was the first Council that was unable to achieve consensus on major recommendations. Its 13 members could not agree on how best to prepare Social Security for the future. But most likely accounting for the flurry of media interest in the topic of Social Security were recommendations for what would amount to restructuring of the Social Security system. Proposals to privatize Social Security by allowing workers to establish individual investment accounts and decide where to invest all or part of their Social Security contributions were being seriously considered.

It is worth emphasizing that most members of the Advisory Council did agree on a number of fundamental principles. For example, members eschewed conventional means-testing and approved continuing to finance the programs through contributions from employers and employees, rather than from general revenues. Members also indicated that full cost-of-living adjustments should be maintained. However, opinions differed greatly as to the most appropriate course of action to restore solvency. The result was three very distinct approaches to the solvency issue.

These plans are by no means the only ones that will figure in upcoming debates about Social Security. Social Security reform proposals have been offered by a number of organizations, some politicians, researchers, and policy analysts, including the Committee for Economic Development, the National Taxpayers’ Union Foundation, Senators Kerrey and Simpson, the Concord Coalition, and the CATO Institute. More can be expected once Social Security moves to the top of the Congressional agenda. Space limitations preclude a consideration in this paper of all the plans. Instead, this issue brief highlights components of the three Advisory Council plans as they may affect women.

Because of the publicity surrounding, and a fair degree of public interest in, these plans, because many of the other plans include similar features, and because these plans could serve as a point of departure for debate on reform in general, it seems reasonable to restrict discussion to the Advisory Council’s recommendations at this time.

Although the three reform plans of Social Security Advisory Council have some elements in common, they approach restoration of solvency in very different ways. The differences can largely be summed up with respect to the degree to which efforts would be made to maintain the system’s social insurance principles, especially redistribution of income, or instead move toward a more privatized system, thereby shifting more of the burden of retirement support to future retirees themselves. A very brief summary of the three plans follows. (Greater detail can be found in Advisory Council on Social Security, Vol. I 1997.)

Maintain Benefits

Of the three Advisory Council reports, what is referred to as the Maintain Benefits (MB) plan would, as its name suggests, maintain the structure of the Social Security system much as it is today. Social Security would continue as a defined benefit plan, with benefits based on a set formula established by law. Income redistribution--so fundamental to this social insurance program and so important in ensuring income adequacy for low-wage workers--would be retained.

Solvency would be achieved by a number of rather modest changes. The plan would, for example, extend Social Security coverage to new state and local workers, tax Social Security benefits like private pension benefits, lengthen the benefit computation period from 35 to 38 years or, alternatively, slightly increase the payroll contribution rate, and eventually shift to OASDI that portion of Social Security revenues generated from taxing Social Security that now goes to the Hospital Insurance (HI) Fund. If these changes proved insufficient to bring the system into actuarial balance, the plan would increase employer and employee payroll taxes in 2045.

The most innovative feature of the Maintain Benefits plan involves the possible investment after further study of a portion (up to perhaps 40 percent) of the Social Security trust fund reserves in private equities in a search for higher returns. Although some observers see such investment as a form of privatization, workers themselves would have no say over how funds were invested; an investment policy board nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate would oversee investments. Earnings would accrue to the trust funds, not to workers’ individual accounts. Despite the fact that the Maintain Benefits plan would make the fewest changes to Social Security, equity investment would nonetheless represent a significant departure from present policy.

Individual Accounts

The second plan proposes establishing mandatory individual accounts (IAs) similar to a 401(k) defined contribution plan. Workers, but not employers, would contribute an additional 1.6 percent of earnings to their individual accounts. They would be provided with limited investment choices, the accumulations of which would have to be converted to indexed annuities at retirement.

The IA plan would also extend Social Security coverage to new state and local workers, extend the benefit computation period to 38 years, lower the earnings replacement rate for middle- and high-wage earners, accelerate the scheduled increase in Social Security’s full retirement age and subsequently index it to increases in longevity, and tax Social Security benefits like private pensions. The result of these changes, according to GAO, would be lower benefits from the “basic” Social Security program for all workers (Advisory Council on Social Security 1997; Ross 1997: 7), although...
benefits from the individual accounts are intended to help offset the losses.

Finally, the 50-percent spousal benefit would be gradually reduced to 33 percent, and the survivor benefit increased. Under this plan, a survivor would collect the highest of his or her own basic benefit, the deceased spouse’s benefits, or 75 percent of the couple’s combined benefits.

Personal Security Accounts

The most radical of the three Advisory Council plans would turn Social Security into a two-tier system. Tier I would become a flat-rate benefit based on years of covered employment that, after 35 years of earnings, would amount to about two-thirds of the poverty level for a person living alone (which was $410 a month in 1996).16 Tier II would consist of retirement income from workers’ personal security accounts (PSAs) financed by allocating 5 percentage points of workers’ payroll taxes to the new accounts.

Workers could invest their 5 percent in a wide-range of financial instruments. At retirement, workers would not be required to annuitize their investments. The Tier I benefit for spouses would be the highest of their own benefit, half their retired spouse’s benefit, or half of the flat benefit, when fully phased in. Survivors would be eligible for 75 percent of the benefit payable to the couple; they could also inherit any balance in the PSA of the deceased worker.

In addition, the PSA plan would accelerate and index the increase in retirement age and then periodically examine the need for additional changes, raise the age of early eligibility, and cover new state and local workers.

Social Security Reform’s Impact on Women

Certainly, everyone has a stake in Social Security, and everyone will be affected by whatever reforms are ultimately implemented. However, as this issue brief and a sizable literature demonstrate, Social Security is without question a women’s issue. Any proposal that would change the system, therefore, ought to be carefully scrutinized in terms of its impact on women. Rappaport (1997: 39) calls for making the changes needed to “ensure that we will have a strong Social Security system going forward,” including a system that “will better handle a variety of family patterns.”

All three plans could lead to long-term Social Security solvency, although their impact on various groups in the population will vary. Just how secure women would be under the various plans, though, remains a matter for further research. Since the Maintain Benefits plan would result in the fewest changes to the system, how women would fare in the future is essentially how they are faring today, although many might be worse off as a result of the lengthening of the benefit calculation period (discussed below).

Under the Individual Accounts (IA) plan, the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) calculates that the average earner would see a drop of 17 percent in his or her basic benefit from Social Security (Ross 1997: 8). Reductions would be higher for high-wage workers than low-wage workers.

The amount invested in individual accounts (an additional 1.6 percent of wages) would be expected to make up the difference between the basic benefit and what would be paid to workers under current law. It may do this, but it seems unlikely that income

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16 Ultimately, workers with only 10 years of covered employment would be eligible for a benefit amounting to 50 percent of the full flat amount; this percentage would increase by two for each additional year worked up to 35.
adequacy in retirement would be greatly improved over what it is today.

The more dramatic changes would take place under the Personal Security Accounts (PSA) plan, whose provisions, especially the reconfiguration into a two-tier plan, stand to have a significant impact on women. As has been noted elsewhere in this paper, women with high-wage jobs have less to be concerned about when it comes to the Advisory Council’s proposed changes (Williamson 1997b: 98), including those in the PSA plan. Affluent women, like everyone else, face market risk under privatization, but would come out ahead under many circumstances.

Privatization, even the partial privatization of the PSA and IA plans, poses big risks, especially for persons with limited resources. Low-income women, for example, have less to invest in the first place and would be less able than more affluent women to weather market downturns. They might also find it harder to obtain good market advice, given their limited income.

It also appears that women are more conservative investors than men (Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner 1997). That being the case, Ross (1997) notes, two investors with identical earnings could end up with very different retirement benefits. Women, in such instances, could expect the lower accumulations.

Women would also see lower benefits for the same accumulations because separate life tables could be used when IA or PSA accumulations were annuitized. Since women live longer, their monthly annuity benefits would be lower than those of men with the same accumulations. Payments over a lifetime might be identical, but that is small consolation when monthly bills must be paid.

Moreover, although privatization proponents generally contend that most workers could do better in the private market than under Social Security, IA and PSA investors would face market risk. How the market has performed historically may not apply to specific groups of workers, and may not be in evidence at the time a particular cohort retires.

Over the long run, investments in the stock market have returned approximately 10 percent per year in nominal terms; between 1926 and 1994, the average return for the S&P 500 was 10.2 percent, or 6.9 percent after adjusting for inflation (Levine and Levine 1996: 222). However, some bear markets are deep and prolonged. On September 3, 1929, the Dow Jones reached a level it did not see again until November 23, 1954 (Pierce 1996). More recently, between January of 1973 and September of 1974, the market declined by 43 percent (or by 52 percent after factoring in inflation) (Ibbotson and Brinson 1993: 162). The phenomenal bull market of the past 15 years is not typical of the last 50 years, nor is it likely to be typical of the next 50 years, particularly if growth rates turn out to be lower than the nation experienced during the past 50 years (Williamson 1997a: 565).

There is also the question of who would actually own the accumulations in married workers’ accounts. In the case of PSAs, the owner is clearly the worker, despite the fact that husbands and wives may make joint decisions about who works and when, and how money should be invested. Under the PSA plan, the owner would be under no obligation at the time of disbursement to purchase an annuity but could opt instead for a lump-sum payment. Unless Congress decided otherwise, that decision would be left to the owner of the PSA; spouses would not have a say in receiving any share of the money. This provision in the PSA plan could

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17 As noted elsewhere in this paper, the PSA plan does not require annuitization. Adverse selection under such circumstances could make annuities very expensive in the private market.
have a disproportionate and negative impact on women.

Divorced women are given short shrift in both IA and PSA plans. They would apparently have to depend on the divorce settlement for any share of the accumulation in a spouse’s account. Williamson (1997b: 103) explains that under the IA plan a divorced woman would otherwise have no claim on her former husband’s individual account so long as he was alive. At his death she would become eligible for only half of his benefit from his mandatory individual account. The divorced spouse of a worker with a PSA could not even count on that, as annuitization would not be required.

Women with sufficient work histories would always qualify for PSA’s Tier I benefits, but that benefit would guarantee substantially less relative to the poverty level than the average woman’s retired worker benefit today. Many women would be able to make up the difference with their PSA Tier II benefits, but others might not fare so well. This might tend to be the case if workers were tempted and allowed to gain access to their accumulations before retirement.

The question of preretirement access to IAs or PSAs is a critical concern, and Congress may be reluctant to limit people’s access to their own money in time of need. Women tend to be less likely to retain lump-sum pension distributions for retirement (Korczyk 1996a ). Might they also be more likely to tap into these new retirement savings, if permitted?

Advisory Council member Thomas Jones speculates that the pressure to use retirement savings prematurely might “dwarf the political risk attributed to the current pay-as-you-go system” (Jones 1996: 5). He also worries that “political support for the first pillar [the basic benefit] might weaken once it is explicitly separated from the individual account pillar.”

Women would have a great deal to lose if this were to happen.

Although the PSA plan represents the most radical of the proposed changes discussed in this paper, a number of the other proposals would likely have a disproportionate impact on certain groups, such as women and those with low incomes. Raising the full retirement age might disproportionately affect low-wage workers in demanding jobs that do not lend themselves to a longer worklife. Skills obsolescence is also a problem for many low-wage workers, who may also be at greater risk than high-wage workers of experiencing health problems that affect ability to work. Not all such workers would be women, but women are heavily represented in the low-wage jobs whose numbers are projected to increase the most over the next decade (Silvestri 1997). More affluent workers, on the other hand, may have the resources to continue to retire early, as well as the education and skills that encourage employers to retain them longer.

Women will also find it more difficult than men to meet the longer benefit computation period. According to Social Security actuaries, only 15 percent of women retiring in 1999 vs. 57 percent of men, would be able to meet a 38-year averaging period (Fierst 1997: 137).

**Benefit Improvements**

Given the need for revenue increases or benefit cuts just to keep the present system afloat, the prospects for benefit expansion would appear to be dim. And, to be sure, like everyone, women will benefit from a fiscally solvent Social Security system.

Yet many people continue to worry about income adequacy in old age, especially among nonmarried women, and have proposed reforms to address that inadequacy. The majority of Advisory Council members (as well as others [e.g., Burkhauser and Smeeding...
support reducing spousal benefits and increasing benefits for survivors. While there are various ways to do this, one way, as mentioned above, is to reduce the spousal benefit from 50 to 33 percent and increase the survivors’ benefit to 75 percent of combined benefits. Such a proposal is actually a nod in the direction of greater equity, as higher benefits would go to survivors of dual-, not single-, earner couples.

Many survivors would be no better off under the change, however, and the change would do nothing for never-married or divorced women, who are among the poorest aged today. In fact, divorced women could be far worse off, as they would qualify for only one-third of their ex-husbands’ benefits, rather than half. While the number of women who collect benefits as divorced spouses is low, they are a particularly needy group. Finally, intact couples would have to get by on less while both partners were alive if one partner were entitled to the spousal benefit. This might prove difficult for low-income couples. Choudhury and Leonesio (1997) caution that this proposed change might not have the desired impact due to the fact that a lifetime of poverty, rather than loss of a spouse, appears to be the primary determinant of poverty in old age for the majority of women.

Conclusions

The market risk of even a partially privatized Social Security system is very real and deserves a great deal more attention than it has received to date. Policymakers, retirement-income experts, and women’s advocates, among others, need to think long and hard before asking moderate- and particularly low-wage workers, a category that includes many women, to take those risks (Williamson 1997a). The market does not just go up. Declines can be swift, deep, and prolonged.

The Social Security Trustees argue that many of the proposals for reform would involve “a profound shift in philosophy and would have significant ramifications [that] deserve careful examination and consideration by policymakers and the American public before any changes are made” (Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees 1997: 13.) The recently confirmed administrator of the now-independent Social Security Administration, Kenneth S. Apfel, hopes to enhance understanding of Social Security and foster dialogue on the tough choices not only on Capitol Hill, “but also in family living rooms all across America” (Social Security Administration 1997).

The level of ignorance about Social Security basics, to say nothing of its financing and reform (see, e.g., Farkas and Johnson 1997), suggests that the public debate and discussion about the “tough choices” must be preceded by a public information/education campaign that tries to provide the public with the tools it needs to make informed decisions. Women, in particular, must be a focus of the campaigns.

However, before Social Security is fundamentally overhauled, more and far better data are required on the combined effect and distributional impact of any changes. There can be little doubt that women’s well-being would be profoundly affected by some of the reforms being considered. Just who would be most affected and by how much needs further examination. Even the experts don’t have the answers. Reform might not make women better off than they are today, but it should not worsen their often precarious situation in old age.

References


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