ANTITRUST

HYPER-TEXT LINKS

Prepared by

Professor Peter A. Donovan

Boston College Law School

(For use only by students at Boston College Law School)

 

I.  Cases

    A. Supreme Court

Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).

United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (Du Pont Cellophane).

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).

Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).

United States v. Sealy Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).

United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610 (1977).

Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).

Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).

Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). (NW Stationers)

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). (IFD).

Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (Scalia, J.).

Atlantic Ridgefield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).

City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (Kodak Aftermarket).

FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (Ticor).

Spectrum Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (Liggett).

State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, (1997). (State Oil).

Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (Nynex)

California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (CA Dental)

 

    B.  Courts of Appeal

Unites States v. Aluminum Coal of Am., 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa).

Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 324 U.S. 802 (1975)

United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977) (Predatory Conduct).

California Computer Products v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979)(Cal.Comp.)

Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).

Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (Termination of franchise).

California Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) (Cal. Comp.)

Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Benfield Importers, Inc., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).

Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).

MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T, 708 F.2d 1081, (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (Criticizes Areeda and Turner "short run test" where fixed costs are a relatively high % of total costs).

Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).

Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985) (Unsuccessful solicitation of agreement to monopolize).

Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.).

United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985) (Unsuccessful solicitation of agreement to monopolize).

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (du Pont Antilock Gasoline).

Jack Walters and Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.).

Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.)

Marsann Co. v. Brammall, 788 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1986).

Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).

Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987) (Bork, J.).

Lomar Wholesale. Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods Inc., 824 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988) (What is predatory pricing?).

USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988) (ARCO).

U.S. Phillips Corp. v. Windmere Co., 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988), (firm's 90% price cut in response to new entry sufficient to show monopolization).

McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988) (Areeda & Turner rule, like Venus deMilo, "much admired but rarely embraced").

A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.).

Town of Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison, 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990)(Breyer, CJ.).

Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990)(Hall, J.).

International Travel Arrangers v. NWA (Northwest Airlines), 991 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1993) (What is predatory pricing?).

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Microsoft Contempt)

Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (What is monopoly conduct?)

Independent Service Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (ISO)

U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Monopoly Finding)

 

    C.  District Courts

United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) (Wyzanski, J.), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).

Telex v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okl. 1973), Reversed, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (selective targeted price cuts of $259.5 million).

Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983) (Monopoly by technology).

United States v. A.T. & T. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981) (Pricing without regard to cost theory of monopoly).

 

    D.  Federal Trade Commission

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980) (du Pont Titanium Dioxide).

 

Law Review Articles

 

3.1. Antitrust Economics

ABA Annual Meeting 1989, Challenges to the Chicago School Approach, 58 Antitrust L.J. 631-68 (1989)

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Report of the Special Task Force on Competitive Policy, 61 Antitrust L.J. 977-92 (1993).

W. Adams and J.W. Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment, 62 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1116 (1987)

J.B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 Antitrust L.J. 645 (1989)

H. M. Blake & W.K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 377 (1965).

J.F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare and Technology Progress, 62 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1020 (1987).

D. Dewey, What Price Theory Can--and Cannot--Do for Antitrust, 3 Contemp. Pol. Issues 3 (Winter 1984-85).

F.H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984).

F. H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696 (1986).

E.M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140 (1981). (Link is to abstract only.)

E.M. Fox & L.A. Sullivan, Antitrust--Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 936 (1987).

H.S. Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39 SW L.J. 755 (1985).

H.S. Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: Faces Sometimes Should Make Cases, 12 J. Corp. Law 1 (1986).

H.S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 892 (1988).

C.F. Rule & E..L. Meyer, An Antitrust Enforcement Policy to Maximize the Economic Wealth of all Consumers, 33 Antitrust Bull. 677 (1988). (Link to abstract only)

L.A. Sullivan, Book Review, 75 Colum L. Rev. 1214, 1219-20 (1975).

 

3.1.1 Chicago School Position

F.H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984).

F. H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696 (1986).

C.F. Rule & E..L. Meyer, An Antitrust Enforcement Policy to Maximize the Economic Wealth of all Consumers, 33 Antitrust Bull. 677 (1988). (Link to abstract only)

J.F. Rill, Competition Policy: A Force for Open Markets, 61 Antitrust L.J. 637-50 (1993).

 

3.1.2 Challenges to Chicago School

ABA Annual Meeting 1998, Challenges to the Chicago School Approach, 58 Antitrust L.J. 629-68 (1989).

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Report of the Special Task Force on Competitive Policy, 61 Antitrust L.J. 977-92 (1993). (Link to abstract only)

W. Adams & J. W. Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment, 62 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1116 (1987).

J.B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 Antitrust L.J. 645 (1989).

S. Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amici, 61 Antitrust L.J. 269-311 (1993).

D. Dewey, What Price Theory Can--and Cannot--Do for Antitrust, 3 Contemp. Pol. Issues 3 (Winter 1984-85).

E.M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140 (1981). (Link to abstract only)

E.M. Fox & L.A. Sullivan, Antitrust--Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 936 (1987).

H.S. Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: Faces Sometimes Should Make Cases, 12 J. Corp. Law 1 (1986).

H.S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 892 (1988).

A.M. Johnson, An Appeal for the "Liberal" Use of Law and Economics: The Liberals Fight Back, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 659 (1989).

R.H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 67 (1982).

R.H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 Antitrust Bull. 429 (1988).  (Link to abstract only)

R.H. Land, Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 Antitrust L.J. 631 (1989).

Willard F. Mueller, The Sealy Restraints: Restrictions on Free Riding or Output?,  1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1255

 

3.2 Antitrust Goals

Symposium, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363-467 (1965).

E. Fox & L. Sullivan, Antitrust--Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going? 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 936 (1978).

W. Adams & J. W. Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment, 62 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1116 (1987).

J.B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 68 Antitrust L.J. 645 (1989).

R.H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L.& Econ. 7 (1966).

K.G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. Penn.. L. Rev. 1191 (1977).

J.J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration's Antitrust Policy, "Original Intent" and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 Antitrust Bull. 259 (1988).  (Link to abstract only)

E.M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 554 (1986).

R.H. Lande, Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 Antitrust L.J. 631 (1989).

R.H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 67 (1982).

R.H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 Antitrust Bull. 429 (1988). (Link to abstract only)

C.F. Rule & E..L. Meyer, An Antitrust Enforcement Policy to Maximize the Economic Wealth of All Consumers, 33 Antitrust Bull. 677 (1988). (Link to abstract only)

 

3.3. Monopoly

 

3.3.1. Monopoly Power

W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1981).

McDermott, Whatever Happened to . . . Utah Pie?, ABA Antitrust Sect., 8-SPG Antitrust 42 (Sp.1994).

 

3.7.1. Predation

Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87 Colum.L.Rev. 1625, 1657 (1987) (Product change).

H.S. Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39 SW L.J. 755 (1985)

Ordover, Sykes & Willing, Predatory Systems Rivalry: A Reply, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1150 (1983) (Product change)

Ordover & Willing, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 Yale L.J. 8 (1981) (Product change).  (Link to abstract only)

Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1121 (1983) (Product change).

Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases and the Transformation of the Law, 60 Tex.L.Rev. 587 (1982).

M. Sievers & B. Albery, Strategic Allocation of Overhead: The Application of Traditional Predatory Tests to Multiproduct Firms, 60 Antitrust L.J. 757-85 (1992).

W.E. Taylor, Predation and Multiproduct Firms: An Economic Appraisal of Sievers-Albery Results, 60 Antitrust L.J. 785-95 (1992).

 

3.7.2. Predatory Pricing

McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1958).

Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing & Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 697 (1975).

Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 869, 890 (1976).

Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 891 (1976).

Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Policy, 88 Yale L.J. 213 (1979).

Baumol, Quasi-Performance of Price Reduction: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 Yale L.J. 1, 8-10 (1978).

Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The RealLemon Case, 127 U.Pa.L.Rev. 994, 1018 (1979).

Scherer, Predatory Pricing and Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing and The Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 901 (1976).

Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284, 286-306 (1977).

Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 87 Yale. L.J. 1337. (1978).

M. Sievers & B. Albery, Strategic Application of Overhead: The Application of Traditional Predatory Tests to Multiproduct Firms, 60 Antitrust L.J.. 757-85 (1992).

Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust, 127 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1214, 1229-32 (1977) (Human animus).

Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 Cornell L.Rev. 738 (1981). (Link to abstract only)

Hurfwitz & Kovacvic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 Vand.L.Rev. 63 (1982) (Good discussion of judicial reaction to A&T approach).

 

3.8. Tying

A. Larson, Antitrust Tie-in Analysis: A Comment, 63 Antitrust L.J. 239-66 (1994).

W. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-in Analysis: A Reply to Larson's Comment, 63 Antitrust L.J. 267 (1994).

M. Schwartz & G.J. Werden, A Quality-Signaling Rationale for Aftermarket Tying, 64 Antitrust L.J. 387-404 (1996).

 

3.9. Vertical Restrictions

 

3.9.1. Non-Price Restraints

J.B. Baker, Vertical Restraints With Antitrust Consequences: Competitive Effects of "Most-Favored Customer Clauses, 64 Antitrust L.J. 517-34 (1996).

Bowman, Resale Price Maintenance--A Monopoly Problem, 25 J. of Bus. 141 (1952).

Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Moror and Its Aftermath, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1419 (1968).

F. H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust L.J. 135 (1984).

F. H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696 (1986).

J.J. Flynn, The Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules in Vertical Market Restraints, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. 767 (1980).  (Link to abstract only)

J. Flynn & J. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1125 (1987).

R.S. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 41 (1984)

W.H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1221 (1989).

Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U.Chi.L. Rev. 6 (1981).

 

3.9.2. Vertical Price Restrictions

 

3.9.2. Agency-Consignment Selling

J. Rahl, Control of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case--A Study in Antitrust Analysis, 61 NW U. L. Rev. 1 (1966).

 

3.9.2.2. Resale Price Maintenance

H. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Conspiracy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 Antitrust L.J. 59-92 (1994).

 

3.9.2.3. Refusals to Deal a la Colgate

 

IV. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES

A. Department of Justice

United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for International Operations (1995)

United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995)

United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers (1992), as Revised (1997).

United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors (2000)

 

B. Federal Trade Commission

United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992), as Revised (1997).

 

C. Antitrust Related Legislation

Miller-Tydings Act Amendment. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), codified at 15 U.S.C. Section 1 (1976)

Senate Report No. 2053 on Miller-Tydings Act, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937).

McGuire Act 66 Stat. 632, codified at 15 U.S.C. Section 45 (1976)

House Judiciary Committee Report on Vertical Restraints Guidelines Resolution, H.R.Rep. No. 99-399, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985).

Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub.L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (Repeal of Fair Trade).

 

D. Antitrust Economics

A. Topics

Insert S&F quotes here.

 

5.1. Antitrust Goals

Text to be inserted

5.2. Efficiency

In rejecting the efficiency claims made in defense of cartels, Professors Blake and Jones have noted that "the courts have not merely found them to be untrue or incapable of truth; they have found them to be irrelevant. Manifestly, the courts, in applying what [Professors] Bork and Bowman describe as a 'model antitrust law,' have subordinated the economic objective of antitrust--to a political objective--the preservation of a self-policing system." H. M. Blake & W.K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust65 Colum. L. Rev. 377, 785-86 (1965).

B. Chicago School Quotes (to be inserted)

5.1. Antitrust Goals

"[T]he clear and exclusive policy intention [was] promoting consumer welfare." R. H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 61 (1978).

 

5 Monopoly

"The main economic objection to, monopoly is that the monopolist restricts output compared to, what it would be under competition." Posner, J., in Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 1986).

 

VII. Microsoft Antitrust Cases

A. Microsoft Consent Decree Violation

US v. Microsoft Corporation, CA No.94-1564 (1997 Complaint)

US v. Microsoft Corporation, CA No. 94-1564 (1997 Consent Decree)

US v. Microsoft Corporation, Sup.CA No. 94-1564 (1998 Justice Department Petition for Order to Show Cause)

"In Justice's Own Words", Transcript of Janet Reno, Attorney General Press Conference.

Transcript of CNNfn's interview with Gary Reback, Esq. who has started private actions on behalf of clients against Microsoft.

"Microsoft Actions Suppress Internet Rivals", Los Angeles Times, October 21, 1997.

"Company Reports, Beyond Browsers", John Markoff, New York Times, October 21, 1997.

"A Hard Line on Microsoft Saying the Giant is Forcing Clients to Install Its Web Browser, The Government Proposes Huge Fines", Naftali Bendavid, Chicago Tribune, October 21, 1997.

"Fines of $1m Per Day Eyed Against Microsoft", Hiawatha Bray, The Boston Globe, October 21, 1997.

"Government Accuses Microsoft of Violating Antitrust Agreement", Stephen Labaton, CyberTimes, October 21, 1997.

Wall Street Journal articles regarding Microsoft Case, October 22-23, 1997.

"When is Success Too Successful?", Editorial, Chicago Tribune, October 23, 1997.

 

B. Microsoft/Apple Deal

"Apple, Microsoft Announce Alliance", Joann Muller, The Boston Globe, August 7, 1997.

L.A. Times August 7, 1997 "Powering Up Deal Gives Microsoft Key Influence With Apple, Analysts Say" Leslie Helm, Los Angeles Times, August 7, 1997.

"U.S. Probe of Microsoft Expanded", Chicago Sun-Times, August 20, 1997, David E. Kalish, Associated Press.

"Microsoft's Regulatory Woes Deepen", Report on Microsoft

Copyright 1997 Information Access Company. August 25, 1997

 

C. Microsoft Monopoly Case

United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. Act. No. 98 - 1232 (1998) (Monopoly Complaint)

Government's Proposed Final Judgement of May 18, 1998

Ballmer's Response to Government's Proposed Final Judgement

Microsoft's Summary Response to Government's Proposed Final Judgement

Findings of Fact of the District Court (11/05/99)

Government's Proposed Conclusions of Law (12/06/99)

Microsoft's Proposed Conclusions of Law (01/08/00)

Government's Joint Reply To Microsoft's Proposed Conclusions Of Law (01/25/00)

Court's Conclusions of Law and Final Order (04/03/00)

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of Law)

Government's Proposed Final Judgement (04/28/00)

Declaration of Edward W. Felton (04/28/00)

Government's Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgement (04/28/00, revised 05/02/00)

Microsoft's Motion for Summary Rejection of the Government's Breakup Proposal (05/10/00)

Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Rejection of Government's Breakup Proposal (05/10/00)

Microsoft's Proposed Final Judgement (05/10/00)

Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of its Proposed Final Judgement (05/10/00)

Government's Reply Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgement (05/17/00)

Microsoft Press Release Rejecting Comparisons to AT&T (05/18/00)

Amici Curiae Brief of Computer and Communications Industry Association and Software and Information Industry Association (05/19/00)

Microsoft's Reply in Further Support of its Motion for Summary Rejection of the Government's Breakup Proposal (05/22/00)

Press Release of Computer and Communications Industry Association (05/23/00)

Microsoft's Offer of Proof (05/24/00)

Government's Revised Proposed Final Judgement (05/26/00)

Memorandum in Support of Government's Revised Proposed Final Judgement (05/26/00)

Microsoft's Comments on Plaintiffs' Revised Proposed Final Judgment (05/31/00)

Microsoft's Supplemental Offer of Proof (05/31/00)

Government's Summary Response To Microsoft's Comments On Revised Proposed Final Judgement (06/05/00)

Microsoft's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Microsoft's Comments on Their Revised Proposed Final Judgment (06/06/00)

The Court's Final Judgement