Mini-Course on Theory and Practice of Matching Markets

Syllabus

Surveys:

Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver Market Design for Kidney Exchange Z. Neeman, A.E. Roth, N. Vulkan (eds.) The Handbook of Market Design, The United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, (October, 2013) 93-137

Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M. Jackson (eds.), Handbook of Social Economics, Vol. 1A. The Netherlands: North-Holland, (2011) 781-852

Slides:

1. Matching and Economic Engineering

2. Two-Sided Matching:

a. Two-Sided Matching Theory

b. Redesign of the NRMP Matching Mechanism Using a Heuristic

c. Many-to-one Matching with Complex Preferences

3. Allocation and Exchange of Indivisible Resources:

a. The Theory of Allocation and Exchange of Indivisible Resources

b. Kidney Exchange

c. Dynamic Kidney Exchange

d. Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange with Trading Cycles

4. School Choice

5. Tuition Exchange